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ABSTRACT 
Because of limited server and network capacities in multi- 
media streaming, proxies are commonly used to cache multi- 
media objects such that,  by accessing nearby proxies, clients 
can enjoy smaller start-up latencies and reduced packet loss 
and delay jitters for their requests. However, the use of 
video proxies increases the risk that multimedia data are 
exposed to unauthorized access by intruders. In this paper, 
we present a framework for implementing a secure video 
proxy or, more generally, a secure proxy architecture. The 
framework employs a notion of asymmetr ic  reversible para- 
metr ic  sequences to provide the following security properties: 
(1) data confidentiality during transmission, (2) end-teend 
data confidentiality, (3) data confidentiality against proxy 
intruders, and (4) data confidentiality against member col- 
lusion. Our framework is grounded on a multi-key RSA tech- 
nique such that system resilience against attacks is provably 
strong given standard computability assumptions. We also 
propose the use of a set of encryption configuration param- 
eters to  trade off proxy encryption throughput against the 
viewing quality of video by unauthorized parties. Imple- 
mentation results on a Pentium III/800 MHz machine show 
that our techniques can simultaneously achieve high encryp- 
tion throughput and extremely low video quality (in terms 
of both PSNR and the visual quality of decoded frames) 
during unauthorized viewing. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
E.3 [Data]: Data Encryption; C.5.5 [ C o m p u t e r  Sys tems  
Organization]: Computer System Implementation 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of the Internet as a pervasive form of commu- 
nication, as well as advances in digital video and compres- 
sion technologies, has led to the recent wide deployment of 
continuous media streaming over the network. A wide range 
of applications such as video-on-demand, distance learning, 
and corporate telecasts and narrowcasts are now enabled 
by the ability to stream video/audio data from servers to 
clients across a wide area. However, because of the high 
bandwidth requirement (e.g., a high quality video stream 
usually has a bandwidth requirement of over 1 Mb/s) and 
the long duration nature (e.g., from tens of minutes to sev- 
eral hours) of digital video, server and network bandwidths 
are major limiting factors in achieving a scalable streaming 
service. Consequently, there has been a lot of research on 
developing techniques for bandwidth-efficient distribution of 
multimedia data to a large client population. One common 
solution, for example, is to use a multimedia proxy to per- 
form some form of data caching (say, prefix caching), so that 
clients can access the cached video from their nearby proxies 
to minimize delay and conserve bandwidth. 
One major problem with the multimedia proxy approach is 
the risk of revealing the original video data t o  unauthorized 
parties. For example, when the original data are sent from 
server to proxy, anyone that eavesdrops on the communica- 
tion link between the source and the proxy can gain access to 
the video information. Some "naive" approaches to  counter 
the problem are: 
a Encrypt ion  using a secret  key  be tween  t h e  server  
a n d  t h e  proxy: Under this approach, the server and 
the proxy will exchange a secret key X for encrypting 
the video data. The source encrypts the data  based 
on X and sends the encrypted data to the proxy. The 
proxy, upon receiving the encrypted data, can perform 
decryption and cache the video data in clear form. 
There are several problems with this approach, includ- 
ing: 
- Data insecurity at the proxy: Since the cached 
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data at  the proxy are the original multimedia 
data, any intruder who gains access to the proxy's 
storage can access the original data. 
- Data insecurity between the proxy and clients: Since 
the data transfer between the proxy and its clients 
can be over an insecure channel, one can eaves- 
drop on this channel and gain access to  the orig- 
inal multimedia data. 
End-to-end encryp t ion  using a secret  key  be- 
t w e e n  t h e  server ,  t h e  p r o x y  a n d  t h e  clients: 
Under this approach, the server, the proxy and all the 
clients behind the multimedia proxy will share a com- 
mon secret key X.  The source encrypts the data based 
on X and sends the data to the multimedia proxy. The 
proxy, upon receiving the encrypted data, caches the 
data in its local storage. Whenever a client wants to  
access the multimedia data. the encrypted copy will 
be sent to that  client. Since the client also knows the 
secret key, it can decrypt and extract the original data 
An intruder can still eavesdrop on the commun~cation 
link between the proxy and the client, but it will not 
be able to  decrypt the data. The major problem with 
this approach is that there is a high risk of revealing 
the secret key X. The reason 1s that a proxy needs 
to  support a large number of clients, and if any of 
these clients is compromised, an intruder can use the 
revealed secret key X to gain access to  the original 
multimedia data. 
Hete rogeneous  secre t  keys  be tween  t h e  server-  
p roxy  pair  a n d  t h e  proxy-client pairs: Under this 
approach, the server encrypts the data based on a com- 
mon secret key X that is shared between the server and 
the proxy only. Upon receiving the data, the proxy 
caches the encrypted data. Whenever a client, say i ,  
bants  to  access the multimedia data, the proxy will 
(1) decrypt the data based on the secret key X, (2) 
encrypt the data based on a common secret key Xi be- 
tween the proxy and the client i .  The client i ,  upon 
receiving the encrypted data, can gain access to  the 
original data because it knows the common secret key 
X,. The potential problem with this approach is that 
it requires high computational overhead at  the proxy, 
because the proxy needs to  perform decryption and 
encryption for every admitted client. This can limit 
the number of concurrent clients that the proxy can 
support. 
In this paper, we present a proxy encryption framework hav- 
ing the following properties: 
The multimedia proxy will only cache encrypted video 
data  and data  decryption will only happen at  the end- 
points (e.g, the clients). Therefore, the orignal video 
data  will not be revealed at any intermediate node. 
The multimedia proxy will perform encryption opera- 
tions only (i.e., it performs no decryption a t  all); this 
reduces the computational overhead at  the proxy, and 
hence allows to support a higher number of concurrent 
clients. 
Data encryption and decryption operations are based 
on well accepted encryption theory that it is computa- 
tionally infeasible to  extract the original multimedia 
data without knowledge of the expected decryption 
key. 
Membership collusion is avoided, such that given (1) 
the decryption key of client i, (2) the encrypted data 
of client j, and (3) possibly all the encryption keys, 
one still cannot derive the original video data. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
present multi-key encryption based on the asymmetric re- 
versible parametric sequence. We then present an efficient al- 
gorithm to implement the asymmetric reversible parametric 
sequences such that the proxy server mill have the claimed 
properties. In Section 3, we present the architecture of our 
video proxy and the communication protocols between (1) 
the proxy and the server, and (2) the clients and the proxy. 
In Section 4,  we report experiments to  illustrate the encryp- 
tion data rate achievable on a commodity Pentium machine, 
and give quantitative and qualitative analyses of the en- 
crypted video quality. Related work in multimedia proxies 
is presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. MULTI-KEY ENCRYPTION THEORY 
In this section, we state the theory behind the design of 
a multi-key secure video proxy. The main theory is based 
on the reversible parametric sequence (RPS) [5]. We first 
present the formal definition of RPS and its utilities. We 
then present an implementation of RPS using the multi-key 
RSA technique. 
2.1 Reversible Parametric Sequence 
Let. f : IN2 -+ IN be a function which has the following 
property: if Y = f (X,  e), it is computationally infeasible to 
find e given that we know X and Y. 
Assume that we have a finite sequence {eo, e l , .  . . , eN) of 
N + 1 elements. (Elements in this sequence do not need to 
be unique.) Define a finite data transformation sequence 
2) = (0-1,  Do, ..., D N )  
based on the function f and the finite sequence { e i ) o < i < ~  
such that 
D-1 = original data 
Di = f(Di-1,ei) f o r O < i < N  
We have the following definitions of reversible parametric 
sequences. 
Definition 1. 2) i s  a reversible parametric sequence of 
the function f ,  denoted as RPS,, if for all (X,Y) E IN* 
and -1 < i < j < N ,  there exists a computable function 
Ri,j such that  
D, = R,;j(Dj) for -1 < i < j 5 N .  
Definition 2. A RPS,  is  called a symmetric reversible 
parametric sequence o f f ,  denoted as SRPS,, i f  the function 
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Figure  1: A graphical  represen ta t ion  of  t w o  RPS, 
sequences. 
I Video Proxy j 
- - - - -  
I Source . . 
Figure  2: A graphical  represen ta t ion  of a n  ARPS, 
sequence for the secure  video proxy. 
Ri,j can be computed from the knowledge of the sub-sequence 
{-%+I,. . . , ej).  
Definition 3. A RPS, is called an asymmetric reversible 
parametric sequence of f :  denoted as ARPSf , if it is com- 
putationally infeasible to determine the function 0,:j based 
on the knowledge of the sub-sequence {ei+l,. . . , ej).  
To understand this concept, we use a graph to represent a 
reversible parametric sequence R P S f .  Figure 1 illustrates 
two RPSf  sequences. In the figure, the original data D-1 
are transformed to Do (or D:) using Do = f (D,  eo). If 
ei # e f ,  then the intermediate data Di will not be equal to 
D f ,  for 1 < i 5 N. For a symmetric reversible parametric 
sequence SRPS,, one can compute the original data D-1 
if given the data D, (or D;) and the sequence {eo, . . . , ej} 
(or {eg,. . .  , e;)), for 0 < j 5 N. In other words, given the 
information {eo, . . . , ej)  and D j ,  one can construct a de- 
cryption function R-l;j  so as to  obtain the original data 
D-I .  For an asymmetric reversible parametric sequence 
ARPSf ,  one cannot compute the original data D-1 even 
if given the data  D, (or D;) and the sequence {eo, . . . , ej)  
(or {e:,... ,e;}), for 0 < j 5 N .  
One can use the properties of an asymmetric reversible para- 
metric sequence ARPSf to implement a secure video proxy. 
To illustrate, consider a graphical representation of an ARPSf 
sequence in Figure 2. The proxy can request to  obtain the 
encrypted version of the original data  D-l from the source. 
Based on an encrypted key eo, the source will transmit the 
encrypted data  Do to the proxy, and the encrypted data Do 
will be cached at  the proxy's local storage. When a client 
i requests the data, the proxy will further encrypt the en- 
crypted data Do using the encryption key ei and send the 
resulting encrypted data Di to  client i. Client i ,  upon re- 
ceiving D,, can decrypt the data to obtain the original data 
D- 1, if i is given a decryption function 0- 1 .j (this is a prop- 
erty of reversible parametric sequences). In addition, when 
the encryption is carried out using an asymmetric reversible 
parametric sequence, then even when an entity holds on 
to all the encryption keys ei for 0 < i < A', it still can- 
not decrypt any of the encrypted data Di being cached, for 
0 < i < N, in order to  obtain the original data D-1. 
Therefore, one can use an asymmetric reversible parametric 
sequence ARPS, to implement a video proxy which has the 
following properties: 
D a t a  confidentiality d u r i n g  transmission: Since 
the original data D-1 are encrypted, an intruder who 
eavesdrops on the link between the source and the 
proxy can only access Do and will not be able to  ex- 
tract the original data. The same conclusion holds 
when an intruder eavesdrops on the link between the 
proxy and the client i. The intruder can only access 
D, and will not be able to  extract the original data. 
End-to-end d a t a  confidentiality: Because of the 
RPS,, decryption of the original data D-1 only takes 
place a t  the endpoints (e.g., the clients). The proxy 
and clients only store the data encrypted as Do and Di. 
Hence, even if an intruder gains access to  the proxy's 
or client's local storage, the original data D-1 will not 
be revealed. 
D a t a  confidentiality against  p roxy  intruders:  If 
an intruder compromises the proxy server or a client's 
machine, and if the encryption process is an SRPS,, 
then the intruder, on knowing eo and e,, can gain ac- 
cess to-D-1. This is because the function 0-lSo can be 
computed from the knowledge of eo and ei such that 
the original data can be revealed by D- 1 = 0- 1 , o ( D ~ ) .  
On the other hand, if the encryption process is an 
A R P S f ,  then even if eo and ei are compromised, the 
original data D-1 cannot be revealed: because the 
function R-l,o is computationally infeasible to  deter- 
mine in this case. 
D a t a  confidentiality against  m e m b e r  collusion: 
If the encryption process is SRPS,, member collusion 
is possible when a client j gains access to  to  (1) ei and 
ej  (where i, j > O), (2) the encrypted data D,, and 
(3) the decrypting function R-I:, . In this case, client 
j (i.e., the intruder) can access the original data D-l .  
For example, given ei, the intruder can obtain Rori and 
thus obtain Do = 00 ,~  (Di). Given the knowledge of ej  
and Do, it can obtain D j  by D j  = f(D0, ej). Since 
the intruder knows the decryption function R o , ~ ,  the 
original data D-1 are revealed by D-1 = 0-l,j (Dj). 
However, if the encryption process is an ARPS,, the 
intruder cannot reveal the original data D-1 because 
the function RoZi is computationally infeasible to  de- 
termine. 
2.2 Implementation of ARPS, 
We need a practical and efficient algorithm to realize the 
properties of an asymmetric reversible parametric sequence. 
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In our work, we use multi-key RSA to implement an ARPSj. 
We first present the basic idea of RSA. We then extend the 
concept to a multi-key RSA framework. 
For standard RSA (or single-key RSA), one needs to  gener- 
ate two distinct large prime number p and q. Let us define 
n = Pq, 
4 = ( P - l ) ( q - 1 ) .  
To encrypt a p e n  data item D-1, one has to find an en- 
cryption key eo such that the integer eo satisfies 
To encrypt the data  D-I ,  we generate a cipher C based on 
the encryption key eo wherein 
C = (D-l)"'(mod n). 
The cipher C can be transmitted over an insecure channel. 
The receiver needs to  have a decryption key do to decrypt the 
cipher. This decryption key do is an integer and is selected 
such that: 
1 < do < 4, and 
Upon receiving the cipher, the receiver can decrypt the ci- 
pher C and obtain the original data D-1 by 
D-1 = Cdo (mod n). 
We can extend the single-key RSA technique to a multi-key 
RSA technique. Consider the proxy server as an example. 
The proxy server needs to  generate two large prime numbers, 
say p and q. In addition, it needs to  generate a sequence of 
encryption keys {e,)oji j~ such that 
1 < e i < 4  and (1) 
gcd(ei, 4) = 1. (2) 
The proxy server will send the encryption key eo and n over 
a secure channel to  the source. The source will encrypt the 
original data D-1 using eo and generate a cipher Do using 
Do = (D-l)"'(mod n). (3) 
Upon receiving the cipher Do, the proxy can store the en- 
crypted data in its local storage. Whenever a client i wants 
to  access the data from the proxy, the proxy can retrieve the 
encrypted data Do from its local storage, and encrypt Do 
using the encryption key ei by 
Di = (Do)"(mod n). (4) 
Moreover, the proxy generates a decryption key di for client 
i. The decryption key di has to  satisfy the following two 
conditions: 
l < d i < 4  and (5) 
(e0ei)di = l(mod 4). (6) 
Computing these decryption keys di can be easily achieved 
using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm [7]. The proxy 
sends the decryption key di and n to  client i over a secure 
channel. The encrypted data Di, on the other hand, can be 
sent over an insecure channel. Client i, upon receiving the 
encrypted data  Di ,  can decrypt the data using di by: 
D - I  = R-l,i(Di) = ( ~ i ) ~ ' ( m o d  n). (7) 
Example: To illustrate, consider the following simple ex- 
ample. Suppose that the two primes axe p = 5 and q = 7 (in 
reality, p and q have to be large). Accordingly, n = 5 x 7 = 35 
and 4 = (5 - 1) x (7 - 1) = 24. Let there be three encryp- 
tion keys: eo = 5, el = 11 and e2 = 13. If the original data 
D-I  = 30, the cached data. in the proxy server will be 
When client 1 requests the data, the proxy will generate a 
decryption key dl such that (5 x 1l)dl = l(mod 24). Using 
the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, we have dl = 7. There- 
fore, the encrypted data for client 1 is 
and client 1 can decrypt the data D l  and get back the orig- 
inal data D-1 by 
d. D-l = (Dl)  '(mod n) = loi(mod 35) = 10. 
When client 2 requests the data, the proxy will generate a 
decryption key dz such that (5 x 13)da = l(mod 24). Us- 
ing the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, we have da = 17. 
Therefore, the encrypted data for client 1 is 
and client 2 can decrypt the data D2 and get back the orig- 
inal data D-1 by 
THEOREM 1. The above proxy encryption framework is a 
reversible parametric sequence. 
Proof: Please refer to  [ll] for a proof. I 
THEOREM 2. The above proxy encryption procedure is an 
asymmetric reversible parametric sequence. 
Proof: Please refer to [ l l ]  for a proof. I 
3. VIDEO PROXY: ARCHITECTURES AND 
PRCITOCOLS 
In this section, we describe in detail our server-proxy-client 
architecture. The video server, the video proxy and the 
clients have been implemented in C++ on a Linux platform. 
In our current implementation, we use a 512-bit RSA key 
to implement various encryption and decryption operations, 
but this can be easily extended t o  accommodate RSA keys 
with a larger number of bits. Security features such as keys 
generation, encryption and decryption axe implemented us- 
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Figure  3: Opera t ions  be tween  t h e  source v ideo  
server  S a n d  t h e  proxy  P. 
provides arbitrary precision arithmetic on integers, rational 
numbers, and floating-point numbers. GMP 4.0 provides 
one of the fastest possible arithmetic library for applications 
that need higher precision than is directly supported by the 
basic C types. 
3.1 Proxy-Server Operations 
Figure 3 illustrates the operations bebween the video server 
S and the proxy P for requesting and caching the video 
data. These operations are: 
1. K e y  generat ion:  To request video data from the 
source video server S ,  the proxy P first randomly gen- 
erates two large prime numbers p and q. Then P com- 
putes the prime product n = pq, the pseudo-prime 
product 4 = (n - l)(p - I), and the encryption key eo 
via Equations (I) and (2). To ensure security, the two 
prime numbers p and q should afterwards be deleted 
from the proxy P .  
2. In i t i a te  connection: The proxy P sends a video re- 
quest to  the video server S through a secure channel 
using the secure socket layer (SSL) protocol. The video 
server S needs to authenticate that the request is in- 
deed from the proxy P.  If the authentication succeeds, 
the server replies with an acknowledgment back to  the 
proxy P through the secure channel. 
3. Authent ica t ion  o f  v ideo  server  S: The proxy P 
authenticates whether the acknowledgment received 
from the previous step is indeed from the video server 
3. 
4. Transmission of encryp t ion  key: If the authenti- 
cation is successful, the proxy P sends its encryption 
request key ea and n to  the video server S through a 
secure channel. 
5 .  D a t a  encryp t ion  a n d  s treaming:  The video server 
S uses the encryption key eo and n to  encrypt the video 
data packets. The degree of encryption is based on the 
encryption configuration parameters (ECP) which we 
I 
authe ication and 









F i g u r e  4: Opera t ions  be tween  t h e  client i a n d  t h e  
proxy  P. 
will describe in Section 3.3. The video server S then 
streams the encrypted data packets to the proxy P 
via an ordinary and possibly insecure channel. Upon 
receiving the encrypted data packebs, the proxy caches 
the data  without decryption or modification. 
3.2 Client-Proxy Operations 
Figure 4 illustrates the operations between the client i and 
the proxy P for streaming the encrypted data. These oper- 
ations are: 
1. In i t i a te  connection: To request a video via the proxy 
P ,  the client i sends a connection request to the proxy 
P through a secure channel using SSL. 
2. Authent ica t ion  of client: The video proxy P au- 
thenticates that the connection request is indeed from 
a valid client i. 
3. K e y  generat ion:  The proxy P checks whether the 
requested video is cached or not. If it is not cached, 
the proxy will request the video from the video server 
S using the operations described above. If the video 
is cached, the proxy P generates an encryption key ei 
based on Equations (1) -(2), and a decryption key di 
based on Equations (5)-(6). 
4. Transmission of decryp t ion  key: The proxy P 
sends the decryption key di and n to  client i through 
the secure channel. 
5. D a t a  encryp t ion  and streaming:  Based on the en- 
cryption key ei and the encryption configuration pa- 
rameters (ECP), the proxy P encrypts the cached data 
DO using Equation (4). The newly encrypted data Di 
can then be sent to the client i over an insecure chan- 
nel. If the video data  are not cached in the proxy P ,  
P requests the data from the video server S using the 
operations described above. then, in a pipeline fash- 












































received and cached in the proxy's local storage, the 
proxy - in a pipeline fashion - encrypts the Do data 
blocks to the D, data blocks, and the Di data blocks 
are sent to the client i. The client i: upon receiv- 
ing the encrypted data D,: can decrypt the data using 
the previously received decryption key d, generated by 
Equation (7). 
3.3 Encryption Configuration Parameters 
Although the proxy P does not need t o  perform any de- 
cryption, the RSA encryption operation - even when im- 
plemented using the optimized GMP 4.0 library - can still 
be expensive. Since P has to perform encryption for every 
client i ,  the encryption overhead can limit the achievable 
streaming throughput and the number of concurrent clients 
that the proxy can support. 
To reduce the computational overhead a t  the proxy we per- 
form encryption based on specifiable encryptzon configura- 
tzon parameters (ECP). The idea consists in not performing 
encryption on an entire video stream, but instead on selected 
data blocks in the video stream. Note that for certain video 
formats, encrypting a complete video stream is inherently 
redundant. For example, if video data are encoded using 
MPEG-1, then one might argue that encrypting all the I 
frames in the video sequence would suffice: since the other 
frames depend on the I frames in decoding. 
We propose to  use a general encryption method that can 
reduce the encryption overhead a t  the proxy for a variety 
of commonly used video encoding formats (such as MPEG- 
1, MPEG-2, and Quicktime). We exploit the observation 
that,  for video encoding that accounts for inter-frame data 
dependencies, a video stream only needs to be encrypted up 
to a certain percentage for decoding to be practically useless 
by an unauthorized viewer, in that either the video cannot 
be decoded, or the quality of the decoded video will be so 
poor that it is unacceptable for viewing. ECP specifies a 
packet based encryption pattern given by four adjustable 
parameters, namely 
Spktr  the expected number of bytes in a data packet. 
I - the video stream is to  be partitioned into successive 
groups each having I consecutive packets, and a single 
packet encryption operation is to be applied to  the first 
packet of each group. 
P - for a packet to which the packet encryption oper- 
ation is to be applied, the fraction of data within the 
packet that should be encrypted. 
B - for a packet to which the encryption operation is 
to  be applied, the number of encryption blocks that 
should be evenly distributed within the packet. 
In our current implementation, we use UDP as the transport 
protocol for data transmission. The entire video stream will 
be divided into UDP packets with each packet having a pay- 
load size of Spkt = 1400 bytes. For every I > 1 consecutive 
UDP packets, we will select the last UDP packet for encryp- 
tion. For the encrypted packet, it will be further divided up 
-=key D ~ c k e t  1 gacker I packer 3 packer 4 
1 1 4 0 0 ~ )  11400m1 I14OORB) (1400KB) 11400m) . 
F i g u r e  5: I l lustrat ion of E C P  w i t h  Spkt = 1400, I = 2, 
P = 0.5, and B = 4. 
into sub-blocks and only some of the sub-blocks will be en- 
crypted. In our current implementation, the sub-block size 
is chosen to be 4 bytes less than the RSA key length (e.g., 
6CI bytes for 512-bit RSA) and the encryption will be based 
on this sub-block unit size. The total length of data to be 
encrypted within a packet is equal to  P * Spkt rounded up 
to the nearest multiple of the sub-block size. The encrypted 
sub-blocks will then be regrouped as B consecuti\~e blocks 
of data, and and the blocks will be distributed evenly across 
the whole packet. 
Figure 5 illustrates a possible set of encryption configura- 
tion parameters, where the packet size Spkt is equal to 1400 
bytes, I = 2 (i.e., out of every two consecutive packets, we 
select the first one for encryption), the fraction P is equal 
to  0.5, and and B = 4 blocks are to be evenly distributed 
across an encrypted packet. The four configuration param- 
eters allow us to  achieve varying degrees of encryption and 
levels of video quality for the decoded stream. In Section 4, 
we illustrate the computational and quality tradeoffs implied 
by these parameters. 
4. EXPERIMENTS 
In this section, we report experiments that quantify the 
encryption throughput, and the peak signal-to-noise ratio 
(PSNR) and the visual quality of the decoded video, in the 
context of our secure video distribution architecture. 
In our current implementation, we use encryption configura- 
tion parameters (ECP)  to control the amount of encryption 
applied to blocks of video data. The experimental results 
are taken on an 800 MHz Pentium-111 Linux machine with 
256 MBytes of main memory. The video samples used in 
these experiments are a set of video sequences, each being 
an 18 MByte MPEG-1 stream or a 4.47 MByte Quicktime 
stream. 
E x p e r i m e n t  1: Encrypt ion  T h r o u g h p u t  Analysis: 
In this experiment, we consider the effect of the parame- 
ters P and I on the encryption throughput, measured as p 
in MBytes/s. Assume that we are encrypting an MPEG- 
1 stream with an average bit rate of 1.5 Mbps. Given 
the assumption, the average number of concurrent MPEG- 
1 streams that a proxy can support is M ,  where M = 
p/(1.5/8). Table 1 illustrates the encryption throughput 
p and the average number of concurrent MPEG-1 streams 
(M) under different values of P and I, when B = 1. As we 
can observe from Table 1, if we encrypt 25.7% of each video 
packet (i.e., I = I ) ,  the encryption throughput achieved is 
received a cached in t e proxy's local storage, t e
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Table  1: Effect of P a n d  I o n  t h e  encryp t ion  t h r o u g h p u t  p (in un i t  of M B y t e s / s )  a n d  t h e  average  n u m b e r  of  
M P E G - 1  s t r e a m s  M w h e n  B = 1. 
only around 2.13 MBytes/s, which implies that we can only 
concurrently handle about 11 MPEG-1 streams. On the 
other hand, if we encrypt one video packet for every 10 pack- E x p e r i m e n t  3: Compar i son  of visual qual i ty  of en- 
ets (i.e., I = 10) and for each video packet encrypted, we c r y p t e d  video: In this experiment, we consider the effect 
encrypt only 4.3% of its data, then the encryption through- of the ECP parameters I, P and B on the visual quality of 
put improves to 11.82 MBytes/s, which implies that we can the video. Figure 6 illustrates the quality of five consecu- 
concurrently support about 63 MPEG-I streams. In general, tive MPEG-1 video frames. Figure 6(a) is the original video 
the smaller the values of P and I, the higher the encryption frames that a client can decode given access to the decryp- 
throughput and the number of concurrent video streams the tion key. Figures 6(b)-(e) are the corresponding five video 
system can handle. frames when decoded without the decryption key. Note that 
Table 2 illustrates the effect of I and B under two different 
encryption percentage parameters P. As we can observe, the 
parameter B has little effect on the encryption throughput. 
E x p e r i m e n t  2: P e a k  Signal-to-Noise Analysis: 
In this section, we consider the effect on the video quality as 
we vary the parameters I, P and B. One way to quantita- 
tively assess the video quality is by the peak signal-to-noise 
ratio. In general. for a frame size of m x n with a total of 1 
frames an: 3 colbr channels (e.g., red, green and blue, each 
represented by a 8-bit number), the peak signal-to-noise ra- 
tio (SN&,,k) is calculated using the following equation: 
where PI (2, y ,  z, c) means that the pixel value at  coordinates 
(2, y )  in the z-t.h frame for color channel c, where c = 1, 
c = 2, and c = 3 correspond to the color channels red, green, 
and blue, respectively. In our experiment, the values of m,n, 
and 1 are 640, 480, and 1000, respectively. Values of PI are 
obtained from the oideo frames decoded by a client which 
does not have access to the decryption key, while values of 
Pz are obtained from the original video frames. Note that a 
lower value of SNR,,,k indicates that  the encrypted stream 
is more highly distorted from the original video data stream. 
Table 3 and Table 4 illustrate the peak signal-to-noise ratio 
SN&,,k for different values of P and I with B = 1 for 
MPEG-1 and Quicktime video, respectively. Note that  even 
when we encrypt one out of 10 video packets, and for a 
selected packet, we only encrypt 4.3% of the data, we still 
obtain a very low value of SN&,,k. This indicates that (1) 
we can apply this encryption technique for different video 
formats, and (2) we only need to encrypt a small fraction of 
the video data to achieve both high encryption throughput 
and high video distortion. 
the video quality is the worst when the ECP parameters are 
I = 1 and P = 0.043, which corresponds to encrypting 4.3% 
of the data for every video packet. Note that when we select 
I = 10, P = 0.043, and B = 1 (this corresponds to  Figure 
6(e)), the visual quality of the video is still quite unaccept- 
able for viewing. This shows that we can achieve high en- 
cryption throughput (e.g., around 11.82 MBytes/s or about 
63 concurrent MPEG-I streams from Table 1) and, a t  the 
same time, ensure that those clients which do not possess 
the decryption keys will get unacceptable video quality on 
viewing. Figure 7 shows the corresponding results for five 
consecutive Quicktime video frames. 
5. RELATED WORK 
Recent research on video proxies has mainly focused on 
caching strategies and replacement algorithms. Sen and 
Towsley [8] present how prefix caching at  a proxy can help 
to shield clients from large start-up delay, low throughput, 
and high packet loss. Guo et al. [3] propose the use of a 
prefix-caching proxy in conjunction with a periodic broad- 
casting technique t o  improve system scalability. Focusing 
on implementation and protocol issues, Cruber et al. [2] 
show how to realize proxy prefix caching by using the Real- 
Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP). Rejaie e t  al. [6] present a 
fine-grained replacement algorithm for a multimedia proxy, 
which targets layered-encoded streams. Kangasharju et al. 
141 present a caching model of layered-encoded multimedia 
streams, and propose utility heuristics whose performance 
are evaluated through their caching model. 
There are only a small number of papers emphasizing se- 
curity issues in a video proxy. Griwodz et al. [I] propose 
an approach in which the proxy stores the major part of 
the video streams which are intentionally corrupted. The 
proxy can distribute the corrupted part via multicast trans- 
mission, while the origin server will supply the part for data 
reconstruction in a unicast manner. Since the original server 
must perform data encryption for each client, this is not 
a scalable solution. Tosun and Feng [ICI] propose a much 
more scalable approach based on a lightweight encryption 
algorithm for multimedia streams. When a client makes a 
request, the proxy will decrypt the locally stored encrypted 
P == 0.257 P == 0.214 P == 0.171 P == 0.120 P == 0.086 P == 0.043
p M P M p M p M p M p M
1==1 2.13 11.36 2.53 13.50 3.11 16.60 4.05 21.60 5.8 30.90 10.10 53.90
1==2 4.10 21.87 4.84 25.81 5.91 32.52 7.54 40.20 10.16 54.19 11.77 62.77
1 == 5 9.06 48.32 10.17 54.24 11.56 61.65 11.64 62.08 11.76 62.72 11.78 62.82
1 == 10 11.64 62.08 10.70 57.10 11.70 62.40 11.73 62.56 11.73 62.56 11.82 63.04
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( a )  P=0.257 ( b )  P=0.171 
Table 2: Effect of  I a n d  B o n  t h e  encryp t ion  t h r o u g h p u t  p ( in  M B y t e s l s )  for  (a )  P = 0.257 a n d  ( b )  P = 0.171. 
~ e a k  sianal-to-noise ratio SN%,,r. fl 
Table  3: Effect of P a n d  I o n  t h e  p e a k  signal-to-noise r a t i o  S N q C a k  o n  M P E G - 1  v ideo  w h e n  B = 1. 
data and encrypt it again using the client's encryption key. 
The major drawback with their approach is that the use of 
light-weight encryption offers no proven resilience against 
attacks on data confidentiality. Furthermore, the need for 
decryption operations at  the proxy results in higher compu- 
tational overhead. Shi and Bhargava [9] present an MPEG 
video encryption algorithm called VEA such that one can 
encrypt a video stream multiple times (each with, say, a 
client-specific key) and still decrypt the video in a single op- 
eration using a composite decryption key. However, VEA is 
not resilient against plaintext attack. Hence, while the ap- 
proach is highly efficient, more determined adversaries can 
obtain the VEA secret key with feasible efforts. 
6. CONCLUSION 
We have presented the design and implementation of a multi- 
key secure video proxy architecture. Our design is based 
on the notion of an asymmetr ic  reversible parametric se- 
quence (ARPS). We discussed how ARPS can be applied 
to a general client-proxy-server architecture. To practically 
achieve the confidentiality properties of ARPS, we presented 
a ~nulti-key RSA technique, and proved that the technique 
realizes an ARPS. In summary, our theoretical results show 
that the proposed architecture can achieve comprehensive 
data confidentiality that is provably resilient against attacks, 
given standard computability assumptions. 
We have an implementation of our video streaming archi- 
tecture - consisting of server, proxy and client - on com- 
modity Pentium III/800 MHz machines running Linux. Our 
implementation results empirically demonstrate how a set 
of four ECP parameters can trade off encryption through- 
put against data confidentiality, for a number of standard 
MPEG-1 and Quicktime video sequences. They indicate 
that it is possible to simultaneously achieve high encryp- 
tion throughput and extremely low video quality (in terms 
of both PSNR and the visual quality of decoded frames) 
during unauthorized viewing. For example, by using I = 10 
and P = 0.043 a single Pentium III/800 MHz machine can 
concurrently sustain more than 64 distinct MPEG-1 video 
streams, while giving good protection for the original video 
data. 
7. REFERENCES 
[l] C. Griwodz, 0. Merkel, J. Dittmann, and R. Steinmetz. 
Protecting vod the easier way. In Proceeding of the 6th 
ACM International Multimedia Conference, pages 21-28, 
September 1998. 
[2] S. Gruber, J. Rexford, and A. Basso. Protocol 
considerations for a prefix-caching proxy for multimedia 
streams. In Proceedings of the 9th International World 
Wide Web Conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands, May 
2000. 
[3] Y.  Guo, S. Sen, and D. Towsley. Prefix caching assisted 
periodic broadcast: Framework and techniques to support 
streaming for popular videos. In IEEE ICC, 2002. 
[4] J. Kangasharju, F. Hartanto, M. Reisslein, and K. W.  Ross. 
Distributing layered encoded video through caches. In 
Proceedings of IEEE Infocom 2001, pages 1791-1800, 
Anchorage, Alaska, April 2001. 
[S] R. Molva and A. Pannetrat. Scalable multicast security in 
dynamic groups. In Proceeding of the 6th ACM Conference 
on Computer and Communications Security, pages 
101-111, November 1999. 
[6] R. Rejaie, M. Handley, H. Yu, and D. Estrin. Proxy caching 
mechanism for multimedia playback streams in the 
internet. In Proceedings of the 4th International Web 
Caching Workshop, San Diego, CA., March 1999. 
[7] B. Schneier. Applied Cryptography. John Wiley and Sons, 
New York, 1996. 
[8] S. Sen and D. Towsley. Proxy prefix caching for multimedia 
streams. In IEEE INFOCOM, New York, March 1999. 
[9] C. Shi and B. Bhargava. A fast mpeg video encryption 
algorithm. In Proceeding of the 6th ACM International 
Multimedia Conference, pages 81-88, September 1998. 
[lo] A. S. Tosun and W. chi Feng. Secure video transmission 
using proxies. In Tech.nica1 Report, Computer and 
Information Science, Ohio Slate Univensty, 2002. 
[ll] S. F. Yeung, J. C. S. Lui, and D. K. Y. Yau. A case for a 
multi-key secure video proxy: Theory, design, and 
implementation. Technical report, Dept of Computer 
Science and Engineering, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
Hong Kong, 2002. Also as CS TR-02-011, Purdue 
University, West Lafayette, IN. 
encryption throughput p (MB/sec)
1=1 1=2 1=5 1 = 10
B = 1 2.13 4.10 9.06 11.64
B=2 2.12 4.09 9.01 11.66
B=3 2.12 4.09 9.07 11.65
(a) .
encryption throughput p (MB/sec)
1 = 1 1=2 1=5 1 = 10
B-1 3.11 5.91 11.56 11.70
B =2 3.11 5.89 11.67 11.72
B=4 3.11 5.89 11.60 11.72
( ) .
l : t 1 ti i / . . .
peak ig l t i ti Rpwk
P = 0.257 P = 0.214 P=0.171 P = 0.120 P = 0.086 P = 0.043
1=1 7.83 8.01 8.52 9.32 9.39 8.85
1=2 9.13 8.30 8.70 9.48 9.87 9.51
1=5 11.17 9.81 10.73 10.81 11.39 11.33
1 = 10 13.06 11.26 12.87 12.60 13.26 12.82
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1 1  P = 0.257 1 1  P = 0.214 1 1  P = 0.171 ( 1  P = 0.120 1 1  P = 0.086 1 1  P = 0.043 
Table 4: Effect of P and I on the peak signal-to-noise ratio SN&,,k on Quicktime video when B = 1. 
(a) Original frames 
(b) Encrypted frames with I = 1, P = 0.043 and B = 1 
- -  
(c) Encrypted frames wlth I = 2, P = 0 043 and B = 1. 
(d) Encrypted frames with I = 5, P = 0.043 and B = 1 
(e) Encrypted frames with I = 10, P = 0.043 and B = 1. 
Figure 6: Quality of five consecutive MPEG-1 video frames under different ECP parameters. 
Rpm"
25 =0.171
1=1 11.38 11.56 11.72 12.13 12.28 12.48
1=2 12.15 12.13 12.27 12.55 12.48 12.77
1=5 12.63 12.48 12.57 12.97 12.84 12.98
1 = 10 12.97 12.76 12.84 13.24 12.98 13.09
l l - ois i Rp€ak
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(a) Original frames 
(b) Encrypted frames with I = 1, P = 0.043 and B = 1. 
(c) Encrypted frames with I = 2, P = 0.043 and B = 1. 
(d) Encrypted frames with I = 5, P = 0.043 and B = 1. 
(e) Encrypted frames with I = 10, P = 0.043 and B = 1. 
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